Actualism Has Control Issues
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2016
Publication Title
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Abstract
According to actualism, an agent ought to φ just in case what would happen if she were to φ is better than what would happen if she were to ~φ. We argue that actualism makes a morally irrelevant distinction between certain counterfactuals, given that an agent sometimes has the same kind of control over their truth-value. We then offer a substantive revision to actualism that avoids this morally irrelevant distinction by focusing on a certain kind of control that is available to an agent. Finally, we show how this revised view has two additional advantages over actualism.
Recommended Citation
Cohen, Yishai PhD and Timmerman, Travis PhD, "Actualism Has Control Issues" (2016). Faculty Publications. 65.
https://digitalcommons.usm.maine.edu/philosophy-faculty/65
