Molinists (Still) Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Perszyk (Faith Philos 20:131–151, 2003) has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom (CCFs) and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga (in: Molinism: the contemporary debate, 2011) has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga’s understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk’s challenge by highlighting further relevant similarities between CCFs and facts about the laws.
Cohen, Yishai PhD, "Molinists (Still) Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument" (2015). Faculty Publications. 59.