Molinists (Still) Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2015
Publication Title
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Abstract
Perszyk (Faith Philos 20:131–151, 2003) has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom (CCFs) and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga (in: Molinism: the contemporary debate, 2011) has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga’s understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk’s challenge by highlighting further relevant similarities between CCFs and facts about the laws.
Recommended Citation
Cohen, Yishai PhD, "Molinists (Still) Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument" (2015). Faculty Publications. 59.
https://digitalcommons.usm.maine.edu/philosophy-faculty/59
