

2021

## Growing Pains Marijuana Legalization in Maine

Wendy Chapkis PhD

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.usm.maine.edu/usm-faculty-and-staff-scholarship>

---

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Staff Publications at USM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty and Staff Scholarship by an authorized administrator of USM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [jessica.c.hovey@maine.edu](mailto:jessica.c.hovey@maine.edu).

# Growing Pains

## Marijuana Legalization in Maine

Wendy Chapkis

---

*Keywords: Cannabis legalization, Maine marijuana policy, small cannabis cultivators, cannabis regulation, legalization implementation*

Taylor & Francis

### Introduction

In 2015 at a Maine Marijuana Summit, just months before this U.S. state would vote on legalization, a progressive state representative, Diane Russell (D-Portland) urged activists not to become distracted or divided over the question of who would make money after prohibition ended. In the face of the need to end the War on Drugs, she said, “conversation about who makes profits off this industry is irrelevant” (Russell 2015b).

I have come to disagree. I entered the conversation about marijuana legalization in the 1990s, writing an ethnography of one of the very earliest medical marijuana patient collectives in the US, the *Wo/men’s Alliance for Medical Marijuana (WAMM)* in Santa Cruz, California.<sup>1</sup> For the members of *WAMM*, cannabis was a medicine, not a money tree. In fact, the co-founder of the organization, Valerie Leveroni Corral, was affectionately known to the membership as the “anti-profit.” Valerie, Michael Corral, and a group of seriously ill and terminally ill patients, collectively cultivated, harvested, and processed a small crop of cannabis and redistributed it *without charge* to the 200 or so patient members.

This glorious, and fraught, experiment in the provision of medicine outside a cash economy survived for more than 25 years<sup>2</sup> despite the challenges of relying largely on volunteer labor and in the face of the very significant threats from the federal government. In 2002, in an early morning raid by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration, the collective’s garden was destroyed, the co-founders were taken into custody by armed agents, and the seriously ill membership was traumatized. Valerie and Michael engaged in years of legal battles in the federal courts before winning important concessions. Early medical marijuana activists, then, were not only doing the work of patient care and cannabis provision but were also on the front lines doing battle against prohibition.

Writing about *WAMM* made clear to me that, while their marijuana was free, it certainly was not without cost to the people who cultivated and distributed it. Now, in the early decades of

cannabis legalization, the debt owed to those early activists is being repaid instead to venture capitalists who are cashing in on a safer investment climate. And, as prominent drug policy reform advocates observe, it is reshaping the movement. Just months before the 2016 election (in which medical marijuana would extend its reach by becoming legal in over half of all states in the US, and in which voters would legalize adult recreational use in four more states—California, Nevada, Massachusetts and Maine) the founder of the national *Drug Policy Alliance*, Ethan Nadelmann, warned that it might be the “last year in which drug policy reform organizations, driven primarily by concerns of civil liberties and civil rights and other good public policy motivations, will be able to significantly shape the legislation. [. . .] as the years progress, various industry forces will loom larger” (Lopez 2015). The same year, the national policy director for the Marijuana Policy Project Dan Riffle resigned because, he said, “the industry is taking over the legalization movement” (Warner 2015).

## How Did We Get There From Here? Marijuana Legalization in Maine

For more than 40 years, Maine has been at the forefront of efforts in the US to end the war on cannabis. In 1976, it was the third state to decriminalize marijuana. In 1999, Maine became the first state east of the Mississippi to legalize the medical use of marijuana. And, a decade later, in 2009, the state created a loosely regulated system for licensing small grower/caregivers.

The 2009 law also created a very limited dispensary system, authorizing only eight for the entire state of Maine—half of which were awarded to one company, *Wellness Connection*—creating various interconnected dissatisfactions. The dispensaries were subject to much more stringent regulation than small growers, including inspections, product testing, and security requirements, a fact that dispensary lawyers and lobbyists frequently complained about. Caregivers, on the other hand, who were allowed to cultivate no more than 30 plants (five each for up to six patients), scoffed at the notion that they were unfairly advantaged by the rules, pointing to the monopoly dispensaries enjoyed on large-scale cultivation and distribution.

The law that limited the number of plants, and patients, for each caregiver, also prohibited small growers from selling any portion of their crop to the licensed dispensaries. Dispensaries were required to be vertically integrated, growing and processing everything they distributed. State Representative Diane Russell acknowledged that “the state artificially created a system that created friction [between dispensaries and small growers] when they could have actually created a system that was synergistic or symbiotic” (Russell 2015a).

Despite the bother and expense of producing a more regulated crop, the dispensaries did well. Their sales showed impressive growth year after year. In 2014, dispensary sales rose by 40% and, in 2015, by another 46% (Miller 2017).

Meanwhile, caregivers, attempting to operate within the legal constraints of 30 plants and 6 patients, struggled. As Russell noted, “It’s hard to be a caregiver and follow the rules because you don’t make any money. I mean, if you’re a good farmer you can develop a huge crop off of one plant. What do you do when you can only sell so much to your 6 patients?” (Russell 2015a).

Things changed for caregiver cultivators in 2016, when they agreed to increased regulation in exchange for the right to legally sell their harvest to any number of authorized patients. In addition, they were allowed (with municipal approval) to open small retail shops (in effect, small dispensaries). The effect was dramatic: the number of licensed caregivers increased by almost 43% in 2017 to more than 3,000; about half of Maine’s estimated 51,000 patients began securing their cannabis through small caregiver cultivators (Overton 2017).

The eight larger dispensaries still saw growth in their sales, but at a much slower rate of increase. The president of the Maine Dispensary Operators Association, Timothy Smale, complained “They [patients] get all this information. They get all these products. They buy from us for a while, and we never see them again after a few more months because they find a better price” (Overton 2017).

Tensions between the large- and small-scale cultivator/distributors were reproduced in efforts to legalize recreational adult-use of marijuana. At least two legislative proposals failed in the legislature in part because the sponsors of the measures (Diane Russell and Mark Dion, both Democratic Representatives from Portland) were unable to secure the support of both the caregivers and the dispensaries. “Both sides,” Russell argued, “want exclusivity in the new market. But the real crux is that I’m trying to bring accountability and oversight to the industry. That’s what the caregivers hate about my bill” (Russell 2015a). Paul McCarrier, the lobbyist for the caregiver community, on the other hand, argued that the proposals, especially Rep. Dion’s, were “a dispensary monopoly model bill. It’s not like you’re trying to say ‘look, let’s put some fair regulations on this [small grower caregiver] sector of the industry to make sure it’s abiding by the laws and the rules’” (McCarrier 2015a).

In an effort to take control of the conversation over what would constitute “fair regulations,” and specifically to protect the interests of small growers, Paul McCarrier, working with a group of caregivers, drafted a citizen’s initiative to legalize marijuana. *Legalize Maine’s* tagline was “save small farmers, keep profits local.” The national *Marijuana Policy Project* had already spearheaded two successful local legalization initiatives (in the cities of Portland and South Portland) and was eager to add Maine to the list of states that had legalized adult-use. But because of concerns that the local group, *Legalize Maine*, was too intransigent and too unprofessional to win a campaign, the *MPP* began collecting signatures for their own competing initiative to “*Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol*.”

In many ways, the *Legalize* and the *Regulate* initiatives were more different in tone than in substance. Both initiatives, for example, provided for home cultivation and on-site consumption in licensed retail settings. *Legalize Maine’s* proposal, however, included a total cultivation cap of 800,000 square feet, setting aside 40% of those licenses for small growers. The *Regulate* campaign believed that a cultivation cap would be too limiting and instead attempted, in their initiative, to protect locals from out-of-state investment through a temporary residency requirement.<sup>3</sup>

As the deadline to submit signatures approached, it appeared both initiatives might qualify for the ballot, likely dooming both to defeat by splitting the vote. At the last moment, the national Marijuana Policy Project agreed to drop their initiative and throw their weight and resources behind the local campaign. *MPP’s* decision may have been influenced by the fact that national momentum seemed threatened after Ohioans rejected a corporate-cannabis funded initiative. As the *International Business Times* reported, “the specter of the failed initiative will likely haunt the cannabis scene for a long time. Looking back, people may see what happened in Ohio as a turning point in the cannabis crusade, the moment when the national dialogue around legalization shifted in ways that might not bode well for marijuana advocacy” (Warner 2015). In short, national marijuana legalization organizations could ill afford another loss in Maine.

While the merger of the two campaigns increased the likelihood of the measure passing, it set off alarms among members of the caregiver community who were suspicious of the intentions of the national organization. Paul McCarrier of the *Legalize* campaign admitted:

“We did too good of a job demonizing them [the *Regulate* campaign]. And people don’t really understand the initiative process so they’re under the impression that, because *MPP* will be running the campaign, that they can just arbitrarily change the language after it’s passed. But it doesn’t work like that. The legislature does not change the wording of citizen’s initiatives if the language is cut and dry”

(McCarrier 2015b)

But, in fact, the legislature did exactly that. After the initiative passed (by a less than one percent margin)<sup>4</sup>, the Maine legislature significantly rewrote the law before allowing it to be implemented.

In fact, the 2016 legislature, changed—or outright repealed—every one of the citizen’s initiatives that had passed that year.<sup>5</sup> The changes to marijuana legalization included removing some of the more innovative elements of the law including on-site consumption at “social clubs.” In addition, the legislature changed the provisions in the law specifically intended to protect small growers from out-of-state corporate competition. The cultivation cap was eliminated, making unlimited cultivation licenses available, thus removing the requirement that 40% would be set aside for small growers. The legislature instead turned to language in the abandoned *Regulate* initiative, adding a temporary state residency requirement for owners and investors with controlling interest in Maine marijuana businesses. The state Office of Marijuana Policy explained that the residency rule would “help prevent large, out-of-state companies” from “controlling the Maine recreational market” and “help Maine residents” keep the industry “rooted in Maine” (Overton 2019b).

Then, just days before the legislature was set for a final vote on the new rules, the largest dispensary group in the state, *Wellness Connection* threatened to sue over the residency requirement for controlling investment in a marijuana business (Valigra 2019). Of particular concern to them were provisions making it difficult for out-of-state companies to hide behind the “corporate veil” of complex ownership structures to disguise out-of-state control (Mistler 2019). The threatened lawsuit would indefinitely delay implementation of the already 3 year old law.<sup>6</sup>

The stakes were clear to small growers who urged the Maine legislature to stand firm and “keep out-of-state interests from gobbling up the state’s marijuana market, and keep whatever profits are to be made from it in the hands of Mainers” (Overton 2019a). The owner of one small dispensary, Glenn Peterson, supported the residency requirement because, he said, “We want to give Maine residents a chance before the big boys come in” (Overton 2019a).

Nonetheless, within days of the threatened suit, the legislature agreed to revise the residency rules. *Wellness Connection*’s attorney Dan Walker, told the press, “We can work with the changes that were made. We do not feel we need to bring a lawsuit” (Mistler 2019). The legislature passed the regulations and implementation commenced. The state began to approve licenses and cities and towns began the process of opting and granting local licenses.

But, one year later, just before the first recreational retail sales were set to begin, *Wellness Connection* reversed course and sued to remove all remaining residency restrictions.<sup>7</sup> The timing of the lawsuit was striking, coming just three days after a state of civil emergency was declared in Maine following the first confirmed cases of COVID-19. The Governor’s safer-at-home quarantine triggered mass unemployment and widespread concern about the long-term consequences on the important tourist economy in “Vacationland” (as Maine license plates read). The lawsuit filed by *Wellness Connection* threatened the one bright spot on the economic horizon: projected increases in tax revenues from legal marijuana sales. In 2019, retail sales of medical marijuana reached over \$111 million dollars making it the third largest industry in the state (Valigra 2020). Based on the experiences of other states with legalized medical and recreational adult-use, sales in Maine were projected to increase to \$180 million dollars in the first year (Overton 2020b). The *Wellness Connection* lawsuit which halted implementation represented a very real threat to that much needed tax revenue in the state. Within six weeks of the suit being filed, the state Attorney General’s office acceded, refusing to defend the residency restrictions in court (Shepherd 2019).

## The Future of Small Cultivation in the State of Maine

Currently, over 75% of medical marijuana sales in Maine are in the hands of small grower caregivers; the other 25% is controlled by the large dispensaries, most notably *Wellness Connection* with half of all those licenses. For now, the medical marijuana sector remains separate from the recreational one, regulated under a separate set of rules. This could give small medical marijuana growers and retailers a limited advantage, at least initially. As David Boyer of the *Regulate* campaign points out, some

communities that have already allowed limited cultivation and distribution of *medical* marijuana by caregivers and small dispensaries may balk at authorizing recreational retail stores: “some towns will ban retail [because] they don’t want people specifically coming into your town to buy drugs. That’s how they think about it” (Boyer 2015). This could help drive business to caregivers and existing small dispensaries. One small marijuana business owner argues, “in the early days of legalization, buying marijuana in Maine will likely mean long drives for many. [. . .] that will likely result in more people seeking a medical use card” (Whittle 2019).

But the distinctions between the medical and recreational sectors are being whittled away. The same month as the *Wellness* lawsuit against residency requirements was filed, the Maine legislature imposed new testing requirements on medical marijuana products to make them more consistent with the recreational market (Overton 2020a).<sup>8</sup> Expensive testing requirements are likely to force small growers and producers out of business, or into investor-controlled economies of scale.

**Paul McCarrier (Lobbyist, small grower, and cannabis business owner):**

I think at least 60% of caregivers think that the law that passed is not good. People tell me, they’ll say, ‘you ruined my life because now the price is going down and I can’t make it.’ A lot of people are going to lose out because what the legislature did; they made it where there’s going to be an unlimited amount of cultivation. But we’re selling a unique commodity that can’t legally cross state lines. And what you’ll see when you have unlimited licenses and a limited market, is a race to the bottom with prices. The farmers lose. And because we don’t have access to traditional financing methods [like small business bank loans], if you’re a small farmer, you’re at the mercy of capital. That’s why, in our law [the voter-approved initiative], we tried to have limited licenses and to ensure that they first went to people who were already in the medical marijuana industry. That would have given those farmers leverage in negotiations with capital when it came to interest rates and equity. But now, if you have the capital, you can go out and get your own license. Why do you need me? You’ll just go out and get the license and say ‘hey Paul, I’ll pay you \$10 an hour to be my weed farmer’ as opposed to ‘hey Paul, I’ll lend you the million dollars you need to successfully develop your company in the foreseeable future but I want 50% equity.’ And you could have said, ‘I want 51%; you can have 49%, and then I’ll take your million.’ So, you could say we are coming to the end of the first Golden Age of cannabis in Maine. I mean, money is going to get involved with this no matter what you do. You can’t stop the flow of money; it’s like stopping the flow of water. It will always get where it wants to go.

With the coming wave of corporate cannabis, much is riding on the consumer. As Mark Barnett of the Maine Craft Cannabis Association observes: “It’s going to be up to Maine consumers to do a little education to learn where their marijuana is coming from. Do they want to support the out-of-state bully that sued the state when it didn’t get what it wanted, or do they want to support small Maine businesses” (Overton 2020b).

Diane Russell, for her part, is placing her hope on “niche markets”: “You’ll see niche markets in both the medical and adult use sides. I think that’s where the caregivers are going to come into play. Because there are a lot of folks out there that all they want to do is grow their bud. They are really obsessed with growing their bud. It’s a calling. And there will always be people looking for them. But the question is, can they compete? That’s the scary thing” (Russell 2015a).

Competition from corporate cannabis is an especially unfair match under the current conditions of federal prohibition. As McCarrier notes, small growers can’t sell their crop across state lines and

cannabis businesses are not eligible for business loans from banks. They also cannot open lines of credit and are unable to write-off business expenses (Fertig 2019). To finance a cannabis business under these conditions means either taking out a personal loan using a family home as collateral, or, for the big players, relying on large private loans from venture capitalists.

Already in some states with legalized marijuana, like Oregon, massive overproduction by large corporate cultivators has led to a glut of marijuana and a collapse in the price (Associated Press 2018; Foden-Vencil 2019; Schaneman 2018). The large cannabis businesses are able to take the losses in the interest of market capture while small cannabis farmers, ineligible for crop insurance and bankruptcy protection, will lose their farms and homes (Fertig 2019).

## What to Do—Directions for Future Research

More research needs to be done on the effects of corporate cannabis on small growers, especially in rural areas where cannabis cultivation under conditions of prohibition blunted the effects of deindustrialization by providing an alternative source of income. Alongside a regional class focus, future research must also stay focused on questions of race. The War on Drugs has specifically targeted people of color<sup>9</sup> while the benefits of legalization are being unequally distributed by race. It is a shocking indictment that, for example, only one percent of legal storefront marijuana businesses in the US are currently owned by Black Americans (Chicago-Lewis 2016).

The “early adopter” states for marijuana legalization, like Colorado and Washington state, did not include provisions to address those inequalities. However, more recent forms of legalization legislation in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Oregon—but notably not (as of this writing) Maine—do include specific social equity provisions. The most important of these is expungement of cannabis convictions. Other provisions have focused on producing more equitable distribution of the economic opportunities of cannabis legalization, such as no-interest start-up business loans or licensing frameworks that give priority to individuals and communities most heavily impacted by the criminalization of cannabis.

These social equity provisions are an important focus of future research; knowledge about best practices will inform better marijuana legalization legislation going forward. But even well-crafted cannabis laws can offer only limited benefit in repairing the massive harms done by the War on Drugs—and the massive diversion of government resources to fight it.

Since 1971, the War on Drugs has cost US taxpayers an estimated \$1 trillion dollars; marijuana prohibition, alone, costs \$7.7 billion a year (Pearl 2018). In a post-prohibition era, researchers could turn their attention to a “peace dividend,” examining how best, and most equitably, to allocate resources to repair the widespread damage done in the name of a “drug-free America.”

But, despite progress in ending cannabis prohibition, the War on Drugs is far from over. Even the war on cannabis has not ended. Marijuana remains illegal in many states as well as under federal law; as recently as 2018, about 4 in every 10 drug arrests were for marijuana offenses (Gramlich 2020). Even in states that have legalized marijuana, like Maine, implementation often seems designed to ensure that some growers and producers will be forced outside the law. It is worth emphasizing that this is not what voters intended by legalization. As Mark Barnett of the Maine Craft Cannabis Association observes, marijuana legalization as implemented in 2020, “leaves Maine voters with almost nothing we voted for in 2016. Mainers did not want corporate marijuana, but that is exactly what we’ll be getting now. It’s going to be a race to the bottom” (Overton 2020b).

If access to legal, affordable, and accessible weed was the only goal of legalization, marijuana will surely have completed its journey from movement to market. “Users” will simply become “consumers,” and “growers” and “dealers” will be replaced by large corporate entities like Wellness

Connection/Acreage Holdings. Meanwhile, groups that have faced disproportionate risk, and experienced disproportionate punishment, during the War on Drugs will continue to pay the price.

**“Tom” (former small grower and formerly incarcerated drug law offender):<sup>10</sup>**

“I’m from Bellflower, Maine. Used to be called Bellflower Mills; they changed the name after there were no more mills. From the age of 10, I saw that the only way you were ever going to make something of yourself was if you grew weed. The weed that was grown in my town was from necessity. Mainly we didn’t even get to smoke it, the good weed. The good stuff got sent away immediately and sold for top dollar. It’s like the town knew that our weed that we grew was too good for us to smoke because we needed it financially. Everybody enjoyed that money. People would get work done on their cars and the automotive people would be happy. People that worked on houses, a guy would have a good grow and fix his roof. It was a really romantic time to be a grower because it was make or break. It was like you can have all those things, like I said: fix your house, buy a truck. Or you could end up in jail. So, I’m kind of on the fence about legalization; I hope maybe some folks in my community can make legalization work for them. But there’s still no work up there; growing marijuana is like the last thing we are clinging to, to be able to maintain our way of life. I worry that some people will think ‘well alright; we won. It’s legalized.’”

## Acknowledgements

Thank you to Elizabeth Lowell for research assistance, and to Gabriel Demaine, Erica Rand, Dominic Corva, and Joshua S. Meisel for editorial comment.

## Notes

- 1 For more information about WAMM, see Chapkis and Webb (2008).
- 2 The Corrals were forced to sell their land; this challenged the model under which they were operating. Currently WAMM is securing licenses and permits from the City of Santa Cruz and the State of California to reopen as a plant therapy center that will include medical marijuana provision.
- 3 As David Boyer noted, under the cultivation cap, less than 150 licenses would be available for small growers, which would create intense competition among the more than 3,000 licensed medical marijuana caregivers who might want to enter the recreational market (Boyer, 2015).
- 4 The narrow margin was due in part to the fact that areas of the state where cannabis is cultivated (Down East, interior, and northern Maine) all voted against legalization. This suggests that small growers remained suspicious. The high levels of support for legalization in urban areas, like Portland, helped tip the balance in favor of legalization, but only barely (New York Times 2017).
- 5 In the same election, voters had also approved a new state tax of 3% on those earning more than \$200,000 to benefit education; a ranked choice voting system for state and federal elections; and a raise in the state minimum wage. The legislature repealed the new 3% tax and significantly weakened both the ranked choice voting law and the minimum wage increase. Legislators then turned their attention to rewriting the marijuana legalization law (Mistler 2017).
- 6 In 2019, controlling interest in Wellness Connection was held by one of the world’s largest cannabis corporations, Acreage Holdings, based in New York. According to their website, *Acreage Holdings* is “a leading, vertically integrated multi-state operator” controlling 1.2 million square feet of cultivation and manufacturing in 20 states. Their board includes John Boehner (R-Ohio), former Canadian Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, and former Massachusetts Republican Governor William Weld. <https://www.acreageholdings.com/>.
- 7 The revised regulations required that, through 2024, a majority ownership be held by persons who resided in the state for at least half of the year and had paid taxes in Maine for the past 4 years. Officers, directors, managers, and general partners in Maine marijuana businesses also were required to be Maine residents.



- 8 Previously, small caregiver medical marijuana businesses were only required to test their products to support advertising claims such as “pesticide-free” or percentage of THC. The new regulations will now require the same potency-testing used in the adult-use recreational market.
- 9 As is frequently noted, Blacks and Whites use cannabis and other drugs at similar rates, but Blacks have been almost 4 times as likely to be arrested for marijuana offenses (ACLU 2013). See also Duchemin (2017) on the disproportionate arrest of People of Color in states after the enactment of some decriminalization.
- 10 Tom’s name and his town have been changed to protect his anonymity (Tom 2015).

## References

- American Civil Liberties Union. 2013. “The war on marijuana in Black and White.” June. <https://www.aclu.org/report/report-war-marijuana-black-and-white?redirect=criminal-law-reform/war-marijuana-black-and-white>.
- Associated Press. 2018. “Marijuana prices crashing in Oregon after state stoked weed glut.” *CBS News*, May 31. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marijuana-prices-crashing-in-oregon-after-state-stoked-weed-glut/>.
- Boyer, David. 2015. Interview. June 4. Portland, Maine.
- Chapkis, Wendy and Richard J. Webb. 2008. *Dying to Get High*. New York: New York University Press.
- Chicago-Lewis, Amanda. 2016. “How Black People are Being Shut Out of America’s Weed Boom.” *BuzzFeed*, March 16. [https://www.buzzfeed.com/amandachicagolewis/americas-white-only-weed-boom?utm\\_term=.ynJQDOVr1#.nhyr3oJbV](https://www.buzzfeed.com/amandachicagolewis/americas-white-only-weed-boom?utm_term=.ynJQDOVr1#.nhyr3oJbV).
- Duchemin, Ashley. 2017. “The Fragility of Legalization: Who’s Cashing in on Marijuana?” *Bitch Media*, October 26. <https://www.bitchmedia.org/article/marijuana-legalization/what-we-gain-expense-people-color>.
- Fertig, Natalie. 2019. “How Legal Weed Is Killing America’s Most Famous Marijuana Farmers.” *Politico Magazine*, June 4. <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/06/04/humboldt-county-marijuana-farmers-regulations-227041>.
- Foden-Vencil, Kristian. 2019. “Oregon Is Producing Twice as Much Cannabis as People Are Using.” *Oregon Public Radio*, January 31. <https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-cannabis-surplus-2019/>.
- Gramlich, John. 2020. “Four-in-Ten U.S. Drug Arrests in 2018 Were for Marijuana Offenses, Mostly Possession.” *Pew Research*. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/01/22/four-in-ten-u-s-drug-arrests-in-2018-were-for-marijuana-offenses-mostly-possession/>.
- Lopez, German. 2015. “Big Marijuana Is Coming and Even Legalization Supporters Are Worried,” *Vox*, December 2. <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2015/12/2/9831980/marijuana-legalization-industry-business>.
- McCarrier, Paul. 2015a. Interview. June 22. Augusta, Maine.
- . 2015b. Interview. January 23. Augusta, Maine.
- Miller, Kevin. 2017. “Medical Marijuana Providers Seek First Chance at Retail Sales.” *Portland Press Herald*, April 25. <https://www.pressherald.com/2017/04/25/medical-marijuana-providers-seek-first-chance-at-retail-sales/>.
- Mistler, Steve. 2017. “All Voter-Approved Initiatives from 2016 Ballot in Flux in Legislature.” *Maine Public Radio*, January 19. <https://www.mainepublic.org/post/all-voter-approved-initiatives-2016-ballot-flux-legislature>.
- . 2019. “Maine’s Largest Dispensary Group Threatens to Sue State over Proposed Marijuana Rules.” *Maine Public and Bangor Daily News*, June 10. <https://bangordailynews.com/2019/06/10/news/state/maines-largest-dispensary-group-threatens-to-sue-state-over-proposed-marijuana-rules/>.
- New York Times. 2017. “Maine Question 1—Legalize Marijuana—Results: Approved.” *New York Times*, August 1. <https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/maine-ballot-measure-1-legalize-marijuana>.
- Overton, Penelope. 2017. “Sales Growth at Maine’s Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Slows Drastically.” *Portland Press Herald*, May 12. <https://www.pressherald.com/2017/05/12/sales-growth-at-maines-medical-marijuana-dispensaries-slows-dramatically/>.
- . 2019a. “Maine’s Biggest Marijuana Company Threatens to Sue State If It Is Shut Out of Recreational Market.” *Portland Press Herald*, June 10. <https://www.pressherald.com/2019/06/10/wellness-connection-shut-us-out-maine-and-well-sue/>.
- . 2019b. “Adjusted Pot Rules Would Relax Residency Requirements for Marijuana Companies.” *Portland Press Herald*, June 13. <https://www.pressherald.com/2019/06/13/adjusted-pot-rule-proposal-would-relax-residency-requirements-for-marijuana-companies/>.

- . 2020a. “Industry Wins Some, Loses Some in Changes to Medical Marijuana Reform Bill.” *Portland Press Herald*, March 12. <https://www.pressherald.com/2020/03/12/industry-wins-some-loses-some-in-medical-marijuana-reform-bill-changes/>.
- . 2020b. “Maine Drops Residency Requirement for Recreational Pot Businesses.” *Portland Press Herald*, May 11. <https://www.pressherald.com/2020/05/11/maine-drops-residency-requirement-for-recreational-pot-businesses/>.
- Pearl, Betsy. 2018. “Ending the War on Drugs: By the Numbers.” *American Progress*, June 27. <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2018/06/27/452819/ending-war-drugs-numbers/>.
- Russell, Diane. 2015a. Interview. June 24. Portland, Maine.
- . 2015b. Remarks at the Maine Marijuana Summit, December 5. Maple Hill Conference Center, Lowell, Maine.
- Schaneman, Bart. 2018. “Washington State Cannabis Oversupply Spurs Calls for Change.” *Marijuana Business Daily*, January 10. <https://mjbizdaily.com/washington-state-cannabis-supply-hits-new-low-spurs-calls-change/>.
- Shepherd, Michael. 2019. “What’s Holding Up Maine’s Latest Attempt to Make Legal Marijuana Possible.” *Bangor Daily News*, June 12. <https://bangordailynews.com/2019/06/12/politics/daily-brief/whats-holding-up-maines-latest-attempt-to-make-legal-marijuana-sales-possible/>.
- Tom. 2015. Interview. July 24. Portland, Maine.
- Valigra, Lori. 2019. “How the First Year of Maine’s Recreational Marijuana Market Will Likely Roll Out.” *Bangor Daily News*, June 17. <https://bangordailynews.com/2019/06/17/business/how-the-first-year-of-maines-adult-use-marijuana-market-will-likely-roll-out/>.
- . 2020. “Maine Marijuana Company Sues State Over Residency Requirement.” *Bangor Daily News*, March 24. <https://bangordailynews.com/2020/03/23/news/lewiston-auburn/maine-marijuana-company-sues-state-over-residency-requirement/>.
- Warner, Joel. 2015. “Marijuana Legalization 2015: Major Pot Activist Quits Marijuana Policy Project, Says Industry Is Taking Over Movement.” *International Business Times*, December 1. <https://www.ibtimes.com/marijuana-legalization-2015-major-pot-activist-quits-marijuana-policy-project-says-2203385>.
- Whittle, Patrick. 2019. “Legal Pot Is Coming, But Will There be Enough Places to Puff?” *Portland Press Herald*, June 17. <https://www.pressherald.com/2019/06/16/legal-pot-is-coming-but-will-there-be-enough-places-to-puff/>.

### Bio Note:

Wendy Chapkis is a Professor of Sociology and Women & Gender Studies at the University of Southern Maine. Her recent publications include “From Harm Reinforcement to Harm Reduction” (*Deviant Behavior*); “The Trouble with Mary Jane’s Gender: gender politics in the marijuana policy reform movement” (*Humboldt Journal of Social Relations*), “Cannabis, Consciousness and Healing” (*Contemporary Justice Review*), and “Productive Tensions” (*Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*). She is also the author of three books: *Dying to Get High: Marijuana as Medicine* (co-authored with Richard J. Webb, New York University Press); *Live Sex Acts: Women Performing Erotic Labor* (Routledge); and *Beauty Secrets: Women and the Politics of Appearance* (South End Press).