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A Passion for Peace: An Examination of Prudential Leadership Applied to Jimmy Carter's Middle East Peace Accomplishments

Lynelle Philbrick
University of Southern Maine

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A Passion for Peace: An Examination of Prudential Leadership Applied to Jimmy
Carter's Middle East Peace Accomplishments

A THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN LEADERSHIP STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MAINE

BY

Lynelle Philbrick

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We hereby recommend that the thesis of Lynelle Philbrick entitled *A Passion for Peace: An Examination of Prudential Leadership Applied to Jimmy Carter's Middle East Peace Accomplishments* be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Leadership Studies.

_____ Advisor

_____ Reader

_____ Director

Accepted

Dean, Lewiston-Auburn College

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Abstract

Jimmy Carter demonstrated prudential leadership during his presidency. Although Carter did not achieve all he hoped to in his quest for Middle East peace, he did meet great success with his negotiations of the Camp David Accords. Carter's success in establishing peace between Israel and Egypt is an excellent example of prudential leadership in practice. This is important because prudential leadership is very rare and it is often difficult to identify.

The purpose of the present study is twofold. First, an original definition of prudential leadership is developed using existing key concepts identified from Aristotle's concept of prudence and the obtainable prudential leadership definitions. Second, a case analysis of Carter's Middle East peace efforts during his presidency is provided, with particular attention to his role in negotiating the Camp David Accords. This case helps improve our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Carter's leadership through the application of prudential leadership theory, along with clarifying prudential leadership for future applications.

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The Statement of the Problem

President Jimmy Carter's leadership is examined as a case exploration of prudential leadership. Special attention is paid to the questions: What is prudential leadership and how does Jimmy Carter's quest for peace in the Middle East exemplify and illuminate prudential leadership? The research to answer these questions originates from a combination of an examination of Carter's actions and writings to determine his leadership style during his presidency, as well as an examination of the literature on prudential leadership theory. This research is important because it adds to the existing literature on prudential leadership since modest current literature is available on prudential leadership. This research also improves our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Carter's leadership through the application of prudential leadership theory.

First, the literature on prudential leadership and related leadership theory is examined in order to develop a working definition of prudential leadership and its key concepts to use throughout the thesis. Following this, Carter's books, speeches, and other and publications that reflect his leadership style with particular attention to his work on the Camp David accords are reviewed along with relevant commentary by others regarding Carter's leadership. This information is then analyzed in order to illustrate how these events and actions demonstrate Carter's leadership from the perspective of prudential leadership in order to explore the usefulness of the application of prudential leadership theory and add clarity to the theory. This study focuses solely on prudential leadership and how Jimmy Carter's work on the Camp David accords are a reflection of this style of leadership in order to tell us more about prudential leadership and to help us better understand Carter's leadership style.

A Passion for Peace: An Examination of Prudential Leadership Applied to Jimmy Carter's
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Introduction

Historically, Jimmy Carter has been regarded both positively and negatively. He experienced low popularity during his presidency, even though he realized several important accomplishments during his administration. Reading the Norwegian Nobel Committee statement awarding Carter the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002, one can see the hallmarks of prudential leadership. “In a situation currently marked by threats of the use of power, Carter has stood by the principles that conflicts must as far as possible be resolved through mediation and international cooperation based on international law, respect for human rights, and economic development” (in Martin, 2003).

Aristotle understood nearly two and a half millennia ago that certain people possess unique virtuous qualities of leadership which, when held collectively by an individual, identify a prudent leader. Uhr, (2005) states that although prudence is an ancient virtue associated with practical wisdom, it is now a term that is used in the field of leadership studies in analyzing prudential leadership. All current day definitions of prudential leadership originate from interpretations of Aristotle’s prudence which are explored in depth in this literature review.

President Jimmy Carter has been recognized for his tireless accomplishments as statesman, humanitarian, and negotiator. Domin (2003) states that Carter’s motivations are genuine and real and his leadership successes materialize because of his core values, and his commitment to further human progress using these values. One such lasting accomplishment is the Camp David accords which Carter mediated unwaveringly, over a period of 13 days, in 1978. This successful framework for peace between Egypt and Israel exemplifies Carter’s

belief that peace can be achieved in the Middle East if it is based on justice and fairness (Bourne, 1997, p. 401).

This study identifies the key concepts of prudential leadership as well as examines existing definitions. The definitions presented from past works are inadequate because they are either incomplete or perplexing when applied to current day leadership. Because of this, an original definition of prudential leadership is developed using the existing key concepts identified from Aristotle's prudence and the obtainable prudential leadership definitions.

The second part of this case study reviews Jimmy Carter's leadership during his presidency, with particular attention to his Middle East peace efforts and the Camp David Accords. Carter's leadership during this period is analyzed and interpreted using the newly developed definition of prudential leadership, in order to add clarity to prudential leadership theory and to improve our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Carter's leadership. Finally, the question, prudential leadership's value and why Carter provides a good case study for this theory is considered.

Literature Review

Prudential leadership literature is not found in abundance. However, key concepts can be identified using the notion of Aristotelian prudence as well as the other existing definitions of such leadership. Aristotle laid the foundation for prudential leadership two and a half millennia ago when he discussed decisions made for the greater good using several virtues. The following literature review organizes the research so that a discussion of Aristotelian prudence is presented first, followed by a review of the existing definitions of prudential leadership. Key concepts of prudential leadership are then examined and a new definition proposed as a synthesis that can be used to better understand a type of leadership and the leaders who exemplify it.

Aristotelian Prudence

Aristotle's theory of prudence provides the philosophical basis for prudential leadership. His discussion of prudence appears primarily in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Although the work can be applied to many kinds of decisions, including personal judgments, Aristotle is particularly concerned about decisions that affect the community. Aristotle (1976) states, "for while it is desirable to secure what is good in the case of an individual, to do so in the case of a people or a state is something finer and more sublime" (p.1094b 5-10). Therefore, prudence for Aristotle is to be used in situations where decisions will have an effect on the greater community and not only on the individual. Collins (2004) argues that Aristotle intended people to move in the "natural" direction from performing small actions to magnificence in order to reach their goals for the cause of the greater good, benefiting the people as a whole. As individual leaders mature and grow in their particular field, they "naturally" take on larger roles and are able to make decisions that affect a greater number of people. For Aristotle, it is nobler and even divine when one benefits the greater community instead of only oneself.

Aristotle spent much of *Nicomachean Ethics* discussing virtues and how they are important in everyday life. For Aristotle, virtues consisted of both moral virtues and intellectual virtues (Deslauriers, 2002). Deslauriers argues that to act in a virtuous manner is to act in such a way that a unique balance is reached between a deficiency and an excess of a trait. For example, confidence is the equilibrium between self-deprecation and superiority, and generosity is the balance between stinginess and extravagance. Deslauriers provides examples of both moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Moral virtues include justice, courage, honesty, loyalty and integrity, among others. Examples of intellectual virtues are practical reasoning, reasoned deliberation, and phronesis (the ability to know when and how to apply the many virtues). Intellectual virtues are used to organize and shed light on moral virtues when prudent leadership decisions are made.

Prudence consists of a combination of virtues and it is necessary not only to be able to possess and perform these virtues, but to have a solid command over them and to know when to apply them. Given the complex situation that results when multiple virtues are combined, a means for organizing them is necessary. Beiner (1983) provides us with an excellent explanation of phronesis based on Aristotle. Phronesis is Aristotle's master virtue that encompasses and arranges all of the other individual virtues. To perform a virtue, one acts on the basis of certain ethical knowledge or on the basis of a particular situation. Without phronesis it is impossible to demonstrate any of the virtues effectively, and to have phronesis is to have command of all of the virtues. If someone possesses phronesis, then one has the knowledge of which virtue is appropriate to use and knows when and how to use that knowledge. Phronesis enables one to have a comprehensive moral capability, since it demands that prudent individuals understand how to see a particular situation and how to apply it to achieve the greatest good possible.

Prudential leadership usually is applied to politics and government given its focus on the common good. According to Stanlis (2002), Burke is essentially Aristotelian in his philosophy and believes that in order for politics to be morally engaged the virtue of prudence is necessary. Burke also believes that *moral virtue* is important to prevent common abuses in government and to enable leaders to make decisions which benefit the greater community. Moreover, Burke (in Stanlis, 2002) remarks that moral virtue is vital when circumstances call for political action that can result in poor outcomes, and oppressive actions are prevented by the use of prudence. Additionally, Aristotle (1976) writes that *moral virtue* needs to be understood in terms of its contribution to the end result of an issue, while keeping it in the context of meeting the highest human good possible, and not necessarily understood in terms by itself (p. 1114b 14-25). Both Burke and Aristotle see *moral virtue* as a means to a final outcome and a commitment to and an understanding of moral purpose, which is vital for prudential leadership.

Reasoned deliberation is another critical component that Aristotle uses for making good decisions. When sound action is called for in human affairs, the components presenting the challenge need to be identified. This allows for decisions to be made that will best respond to the subject matter at hand (Sternberg, 2005). Aristotle (1976) states, “agents are compelled at every step to think out for themselves what the circumstances demand” (p.1104a 5-10). Without this knowledge of the relationship of means to the ends, prudence cannot exist.

In sum, Aristotle believed that a prudent leader possesses moral virtues and intellectual virtues, and wants to do the right thing for the right reason and has the ability to do this right thing at the right time in order to benefit the greater good. He believed that prudence keeps politics just and noble and that a prudent leader leads for the common good because he can do nothing else, knowing that he should do this. A prudent leader possesses phronesis and

this allows the leader to use the correct virtue at the correct moment. For Aristotle, a prudent leader must have a combination of moral virtues and intellectual virtues including phronesis along with a desire to lead for the common good.

Existing Prudential Leadership Definitions

Several definitions of prudence and prudential leadership can be found, all of which evolved from Aristotle's prudence as previously discussed. Many of the terms discussed here are philosophical in nature and require a moment to reflect upon the meaning. However, because prudential leadership has its foundations in moral virtues along with other Aristotelian ideas, it is necessary to present these definitions using philosophical terminology. This researcher creates a simplified definition at the end of the literature review to help the reader come to a better understanding of prudential leadership and its potential usefulness.

Dorsey (2002) believes that prudence involves a balance between virtue of thought and virtue of character. These two virtues are critical for a prudent leader to be able to arrive at an ethically correct answer. Virtue of thought encompasses the ability for a person to reason soundly in order to achieve the desired end results which will benefit the greater community. This can also be referred to as practical intelligence, where a prudent leader is deliberate and rational, making the best decisions possible in order to guarantee the community's best interests. Virtue of character includes traits that are also known as hallmarks of a good moral fiber. Current day leaders who demonstrate the virtues of honesty, justice, fairness, generosity, decency, and kindness are often referred to as having a good moral character (Dorsey, 2002). Both virtue of character and virtue of thought, are required to be balanced in order to find the best results for all parties involved. Dorsey argues that, even more importantly, a good leader needs to be able to demonstrate this balance of good sense and good character, in order to achieve satisfactory results for the benefit of the greater

community. Therefore, Dorsey's prudential leadership is characterized by a practical intelligence combined with the ability to deliberate rationally and with virtues of character applied during the process, in order to achieve the goals necessary for the greater good of the citizenry.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1981) states prudence includes the ability to judge well in practical matters because it is important that sound reason be applied to the area of moral and political action. Aquinas argues, "It is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason and the singulars with which ethical action is concerned" (p. 1345-85). For Aquinas, prudence involves the synchronization of moral principle and sound reason with political action. Abraham Lincoln provides us with an example of a prudent leader as defined by Aquinas. Lincoln demonstrated prudence when he made the decision to preserve the Union for the greater good of America (Fornieri, 2002). He considered the particular circumstances of the time period using sound reason and applied moral principle in his decision making. Fornieri points out that Lincoln took political action using the legal framework of the Constitution and moral principles of the Declaration of Independence to accomplish both preservation of the Union and to attain the goal of ending slavery.

Statler, Roos, and Victor (2007) equate Aristotle's prudence to practical wisdom. They identify four separate parts of prudence in their definition. The first part consists of a review of the goals and desires of the individual who is considering making a judgment and taking action. Next, one needs to make sure that the values of the proposed action are helpful to the community of stakeholders. Third, one must study the proposed action to see if it will provide an instant result where there will be a positive ethical outcome for the community of stakeholders based on available information and perceptions. Finally, since Aristotle believes that anyone who really knew the good had to do the good, prudence according to Statler, Roos, and Victor involves the action itself. "Effective strategic leadership involves

developing the practical wisdom necessary to make judgments and take actions that serve the good of the community even in the face of ambiguous or uncertain circumstances” (Statler et al., 2007, p. 164). According to Statler et al., practical wisdom or prudence involves empowering individual leaders to make decisions using the four elements defined above as guidelines, so that certain desirable results can be achieved for the well-being of the community. This explanation of prudential leadership requires that one develop practical wisdom, where the previous definitions assume that one possesses the necessary virtues or does not possess them.

Fishman (2001), a political scientist, is a prominent scholar on prudential leadership theory. His definition is found in his book, *The Prudential Presidency*. Prudential leadership in Fishman’s analysis is the ability to realize intangible ends through tangible means available to us so that we may do the right thing to the right person at the right time by using the right means and in the right manner. According to Fishman, political leaders should establish policies and procedures that help prevent the corruption of moral ideals even under difficult circumstances. Prudent leaders have high expectations, but are willing to accept less when their efforts fail. They never give up hope for a better world even with an understanding of the obstacles to their goals. They do the best they can under all conditions to align real world circumstances with ethical ideals. Prudential leadership for Fishman is about making decisions using the information available, and applying moral ideals, so that the greatest good is achieved for all.

Dorsey (2002), Aquinas (1981), Statler et al. (2007) and Fishman (2001) all agree that prudential leadership has its origins in Aristotle philosophy. They each offer different definitions where they explore similar concepts, but argue that one area is more important than the others. For Dorsey (2002), a balance between virtue of thought and virtue of character, or practical intelligence, is the foundation of a prudent leader. Aquinas (1981)

believes that prudence involves a coordination of moral principle and sound reason with *political action*. Statler et al. (2007) provides us with a four step explanation in order to offer the prudent leader a structure to develop practical wisdom, take action, and to have the ability to make good judgments. Finally, Fishman (2001) argues that prudent leaders should use all available information while applying their ideals in order to achieve the best possible result. All authors state that the end result must benefit the common good. This overarching idea that one must work to support the greater good and not only the individual, is also a fundamental aspect of Aristotle's explanation of prudence.

Key Concepts of Prudential Leadership

The *breadth and depth of a leader's life's experiences* are an important aspect of prudence. Sternberg (2005) calls this ability to understand one's own life and to also have the ability to make sense of one's environment, community, surroundings, and how everything fits together, "circumspection." It is important that a prudent leader understands a situation and shows strength of character when making decisions which will affect many individuals. Sternberg (2005) also argues that it is necessary to be a whole human being in order to make reasoned sense of a given situation. A prudent leader must have the innate ability and be able to draw on past experiences in order to see how everything fits together, and then be able to make decisions which will benefit the greater good.

Practical wisdom requires the prudent leader to make a judgment and take action. Statler et al. (2007) explain that *intentions* are important in practical wisdom. If one seeks personal gain instead of benefiting the community of stakeholders, the "good life" cannot be attained. One must acknowledge the reality of the complexity of the situation and be willing to adjust to the situation, so that certain desirable results can be achieved which will benefit the greater community. Statler et al. also state that practical wisdom requires that the prudent

leader understand the *intricacy of the situation* and be willing to take action using sound reason and moral principles to achieve the best results possible.

Prudence requires that a leader's actions are for the *common good*. Jimmy Carter (in Knapp, 2007) writes that it is important for leaders to have a strong strength of character and to respond to global problems by rising above pressures from political and social agents in order to serve the common good. He refers to this type of leadership as "*social courage*". Often prudent leaders must make unpopular decisions in order to reach the desired goal of benefiting many as opposed to a select few. Aristotle reinforces this leading for the common good provision by stating that prudence is nobler and more effective when applied to the common good rather than used for individual gain (Aristotle, 1976).

Moral virtues are critical to prudence. Prudent leaders need to have the ability to reconcile moral principles and have a firm understanding of moral purpose, while leading for the common good without putting their personal ideals in jeopardy. Since humans can distinguish good from bad, just from unjust, and act on these moral virtues, we can recognize the moral responsibility of the prudent leader to choose the right path and make the right choice which will benefit the common good (Fishman, 2002). It is important that a prudent leader know how and when to apply these moral virtues as Beiner (1983) explained in his description of Aristotle's master virtue, *phronesis*. This balance of practical intelligence and virtue of character allows the prudent leader to make *deliberate and rational decisions* that benefit the community's best interests (Dorsey, 2002).

Prudential Leadership Defined

Based on the literature examined above, this researcher finds the existing definitions of prudential leadership inadequate for the case study that follows, since each scholar provides only certain aspects of prudential leadership in their definition. Because of this, an inclusive

definition is presented here composed of a synthesis of what has come before. The new definition of prudential leadership offered here includes all of the following:

1. Prudent leaders have the ability to organize, keep in balance, and make use of several moral virtues and intellectual virtues simultaneously.
2. Prudent leaders lead so that the greatest good is achieved for all without regard for individual gain.
3. Prudent leaders have the ability to reason soundly while showing good moral judgment.
4. Prudent leaders must take action in order to achieve the desired goal; this follows a period of reasoned deliberation, including a review of environmental circumstances and an understanding of moral purpose.
5. Prudent leaders must do the best they can to align their moral purpose with real world circumstances in order to achieve results that will benefit the greater good.
6. Prudent leaders have to revisit their goals and make adjustments as environmental circumstances change, in order to reach the best possible conclusions that will reap the greatest benefits for the common good.
7. Prudent leaders do the right thing at the right time for the right reason in the right manner, all so that the greatest good is achieved for everyone.

This definition is comprehensive, since it encompasses not only Aristotelian principles but real world leadership ideals as well, that can be applied to today's swiftly changing global political and business climate. Prudential leadership is a complex model which does not apply to a great number of leaders. However, it is a valuable construct which can be used to examine political leaders and others who have made significant contributions to society or to raise questions about what leadership should be. Without a comprehensive definition, prudential leadership is a less effective concept for examining leadership. For example, a

leader may enjoy moral virtues but not be a prudential leader, since they may not be in possession of phronesis, which enables them to be effective. Next, Carter's leadership and particularly his work during the Camp David accords negotiations is analyzed in order to add clarity to prudential leadership as defined here. Applying prudential leadership to Carter will also help explain his leadership during the Camp David accords and his leadership in general.

Method

The concept of prudential leadership is applied to an actual leadership situation using a single case study. This instrumental case study allows the investigator to illustrate how a case study can contribute to a redefinition and expression of prudential leadership theory. According to Creswell (2007), an instrumental case study allows the researcher to focus on a single subject or area, in this case prudential leadership; the researcher then selects a delimited case to illustrate the issue. This method is valuable because it allows a theory to be fully applied to a single event in order to clarify the theory and learn about the importance of the event.

In the second part of the paper, the prudential leadership definition created in the literature review is applied to Jimmy Carter's Middle East peace efforts during his administration as President of the United States. Particular attention is spent on Carter's mediation of the Camp David Accords as well as the time immediately preceding and following this event. An overview of Carter's Middle East peace process is presented at the beginning of the next section, followed by a detailed analysis of each identified area of prudential leadership, as defined in the literature reviewed, and how it can be applied to Carter.

Case Analysis

Background

During the fall of 1978, Camp David provided the setting of an unprecedented example of American diplomacy, lead by Jimmy Carter. President Jimmy Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat, met for 13 days and overcame great obstacles in order to reach an historic agreement. According to Martin and Barnes (2003), the effect of the Camp David Summit was to create a peace treaty between the two major antagonists in the Middle East, Egypt and Israel, and to initiate a process in which a regional comprehensive peace could be pursued. There have been four wars between Israel and Egypt since Israel was established in 1948; and since the signing of the Camp David Accords, there have been no wars between the two countries (Carter, 1978). The events leading up to this historical peace summit are briefly outlined below in order to enable an understanding of the challenging circumstances at the time.

The Middle East has been on America's foreign policy agenda ever since Truman was president. When Carter entered the White House in 1977, the Middle East was extremely unstable. According to Bradley (1981) every American President has had to deal with addressing the major interests of the United States in the Middle East. These interests include: the unrestricted flow of Middle Eastern oil to the United States and its allies, restricting Soviet expansion in the region, maintaining a "special relationship" with Israel in order to reaffirm its right to exist as a nation, and cultivating friendly relations with moderate Arab states (Bradley, 1981, p. 1).

According to Reynolds (2007) the Middle East peace initiative became a priority when the Carter Administration took office in January 1977. Carter approached the Middle East using an innovative manner, since previous administrations had practiced disengagement diplomacy in the Middle East, not peace. Reynolds (2007) affirms that Carter is an idealist

who encouraged a more ethical foreign policy where human rights rated high on the list of objectives. Carter (2006) states, “one of the major goals of my life, while in political office and since, has been to help ensure lasting peace for Israelis and others in the Middle East” (p. 11). Carter brought a new moral basis to American foreign policy that reflected the goodness of the American people (Merkley, 2004, p. 92).

Stein (1999) states, when Carter took office in 1977 he gained mastery of the Middle East players and how past conflicts have affected the region. Carter met resistance when he spoke of peace in the Middle East but the more he studied the situation the more committed he became. Hargrove (1988) argues many advisors wanted Carter to abandon his commitment to Middle East peace because they felt it was a losing proposition. Merkley (2004) states, Carter gave priority to achieving a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He was willing to take great political risks in this endeavor, alarming those in his inner circle (p. 93).

Carter (2006) explains that the Middle East situation consisted of several challenges. In 1977 a formal state of war existed between Israel and its neighbors, including Egypt. Millions of Palestinian Arabs lived under control of Israel in the West bank and Gaza territories. Egypt had lost the Sinai territory to Israel in the Six Day War in 1967 and now wanted it returned to them in its entirety. The Middle East was considered the most likely location for a superpower war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was in this context that Carter took office.

The first year of Carter’s administration was fraught with failed Middle East initiatives. However, in November of 1977, President Sadat became the first Arab leader to ever set foot in Israel, changing the dynamics of the region (Merkley, 2004, p. 112). Carter encouraged Begin to reciprocate, and for a short time there was hope of peace talks gaining momentum. However, by the summer of 1978, progress toward an agreement had stalled, with both sides

participating in heated rhetoric. Bourne (1997) acknowledges that Carter saw this as an opportunity and wanted to seize it even though his advisors advocated not getting involved.

Carter dispatched Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the Middle East to invite both Begin and Sadat to Camp David for a summit. Cullen (2003) argues both leaders gladly accepted the offer since having American involvement in negotiations would provide them with either a scapegoat if the talks failed or result in a stronger relationship with the United States if the talks succeeded. Israel was coming into the Camp David Summit with little hope for peace. They absolutely refused to trade occupied land for any peace agreement. Bourne (1997) argues Begin did not want to be put into a position where he would have to make a decision that would be unpopular back home; he would rather have no agreement at all. Bourne continues stating that Sadat, had formed a friendly relationship with Carter earlier and was looking forward to working with his friend, even though Sadat faced condemnation from the Arab world since they saw his behavior as treasonous.

All three leaders and their staffs arrived at Camp David on September 5, 1978. During the next 13 days it appeared that a peace agreement would not be achieved due to the inability of the leaders to agree on the critical issues until the last possible moment, when an agreement was reached. According to Stein (1999), all three leaders had hoped to gain different objectives at the summit. The United States want a comprehensive agreement which would not only stabilize the region but also establish autonomy for the Palestinians. The Israelis wanted not only peace, but to be recognized as a State by Arabs without giving back any land obtained in the war of 1967. Egypt sought not only peace but to have the Sinai Peninsula returned to them without continued Israeli occupation. At the end of the thirteen days, all parties involved were elated that at least a framework had been achieved. With the signing of the treaty in March 1979, the first peace treaty between Israel and one of its neighbors was realized (Carter, 2006).

So how is prudential leadership relevant to Carter's quest for Middle East peace? We begin by looking at each aspect of prudential leadership previously defined and apply them to Carter in order to clarify and demonstrate both the usefulness of prudential leadership theory and to help understand Carter's leadership better. Each of the seven aspects will be examined separately, followed by an explanation of the importance of the theory as it applies to Carter. *First aspect: Prudent leaders have the ability to organize, keep in balance, and make use of several moral virtues and intellectual virtues simultaneously.*

As Bernier (1983) explains, prudence requires that one become a master of the virtue of phronesis. Phronesis is the grand virtue which encompasses and arranges all other virtues. When someone possesses phronesis they have the knowledge of which virtue is appropriate to use and know when and how to apply that knowledge. Carter demonstrated phronesis during his administration and especially at the Camp David Summit when he used several virtues simultaneously.

One needs to have good organization skills and be well informed in order to demonstrate phronesis. Carter (1982) demonstrated his organization skills in his preparation for the Camp David Summit. He carefully listed his goals as well as potential problems when preparing for the summit, and stated that he kept meticulous notes during the summit because of the historical importance of the Camp David talks. Reynolds (2007) says that along with a wealth of knowledge that Carter obtained in preparation for the summit, he also brought along the following items to Camp David: briefing books, prior meeting notes, and his annotated bible (*which proved invaluable during the talks*). Carter used this knowledge effectively at Camp David by applying phronesis.

According to Reynolds (2007) Carter invested a great deal of time and energy in preparing for the peace talks. In his memoir, *Keeping Faith*, Carter wrote that he spent July 4, 1977 reflecting on the Middle East, and probing for new ideas.

I caught up on back reading...and read an analysis of the Middle East questions.

Studied maps of Israel, Jerusalem, history of the Palestinian question, and the United Nations resolutions that are now the basis for future negotiations (p. 289).

While many leaders would have spent their holiday time relaxing, Carter felt compelled to study the Middle East problem further in order to advance the peace effort. This studying helped him to organize not only his thoughts but to apply his virtues to the process as a whole.

Camp David was the perfect setting for Carter to make good use of his moral and intellectual virtues. Reynolds (2007) argues Carter was comfortable at Camp David and felt that the seclusion of the location would enable all parties to work uninterrupted towards an agreement. Carter was able to create an atmosphere of unity, as much as possible, given the parties involved at Camp David (Hargrove, 1988). Carter also brought support for himself to Camp David. He wrote in *Keeping Faith* that both his son and wife provided moral support and were trusted confidants. Bourne (1997) states having family members present also precipitated an atmosphere of casual comfort and social opportunities.

Hargrove (1988) argues that Carter is very insightful and has the ability to identify problems that need solutions. This intellectual virtue was evident throughout the Camp David process. Carter often saw what needed to be done in order to keep the talks progressing. For example, when Begin became obsessed with terminology in the proposed agreement and was ready to refuse any compromise, Carter sat down with him with his dictionary and his Bible, and meticulously searched until acceptable terminology was found, enabling the talks to continue (Carter, 1982, p. 377). Since Carter loved to learn and had prepared extensively for the summit he was able to use his intellectual virtues to the fullest extent.

Carter is a true humanitarian who also possesses the necessary moral and intellectual virtues to make a difference. Hargrove (1988) states, Carter relied not only on his prior

research, but also on his personal effort, will power, and moral persuasion at Camp David. In a personality study, Rubenzer and Faschingbauer (2004) state that Carter rated in the top five of all past United States presidents in the categories of Character and Integrity. This category of traits includes conscientiousness, character, openness to experience and new ways of doing things, neuroticism, and agreeableness. Rubenzer and Faschingbauer (2004) also state that Carter scored very high in achievement striving, sympathy, and organization, as well as being unusually attuned to art and beauty. “Carter scored the highest of all presidents on Simonton’s Achievement and Pacifism scales and on our scales of Science and Math Ability and Religiousness” (Rubenzer & Faschingbauer, 2004, p. 230). Carter’s scores on these scales were very similar to the scores of both Lincoln and Jefferson. The scales mentioned above are based on decades of research on the observation of personality traits, methods of measuring them, and statistical techniques (Rubenzer & Faschingbauer, 2004, p. xii). Carter’s intellectual ability along with his strong moral compass enabled him to control and use his various virtues at Camp David.

According to Ryback (1985) Carter was particularly effective as a leader when he could put his virtues to use in small groups. Bercovitch (1986) states, the Camp David Summit was structured so that each of the three participating parties brought small teams of advisors and support staff with them, each numbered around 50. The ability to get to know individuals while working towards an agreement enabled Carter to balance his intellectual virtues with his moral humanitarian virtues at Camp David. The setting and parties involved proved the perfect situation for Carter to demonstrate phronesis.

Second aspect: Prudent leaders lead so that the greatest good is achieved for all without regard for individual gain.

Carter was the first American President to volunteer information about his religious beliefs and to explain how he connected his faith to public issues (Merkley, 2004). His

openness about his faith affirms the fact that his demanding moral code came from altruistic intentions. Rubenzer and Faschingbauer (2004) argue that Carter felt that we can never do too much for the poor and elderly, and that political leaders should focus more on the human side of problems. Berggren (2005) also believes that Carter did not approach problems that would yield him personal gain, he tackled problems that would bring him spiritual solace. Berggren provides several examples where Carter made unpopular decisions because he felt it was the right thing to do. One such example took place at the beginning of Carter's administration when he took the stance that unnecessary government spending (*pork*) should be curtailed. This was met with strong resistance from his Democratic Congress and was a very unpopular decision universally in national politics. This decision yielded Carter no personal gain, however, he did feel that he was doing the right thing for America by preventing wasteful spending.

Deibel (1987) argues that Carter wanted to advance the United States' presence in the world by becoming more "humane and moral." In March 1977, Carter suggested that the Palestinians needed a homeland and that in order for this to take place permanent borders for Israel needed to be established (Bradley, 1981, p. 10). Carter (2009) reflects that this news was received negatively in America, especially by the American Jewish population. Reynolds (2007) states, Carter stood by this unpopular statement because he saw the Palestinians' predicament as an analogue to America's Civil Rights Movement. Carter was able to show resolve in his humanistic approach because he had such great confidence in humankind and was not interested in individual gain. Sadat felt that Carter was courageous when he expressed his opinion that the Palestinian people needed a homeland (El-Sadat, 1984, p.99). Sadat understood the political risks of such a statement and was impressed that Carter would expose himself to such political peril for humanitarian purposes and not for self gain.

Carter was willing to take personal political risk in negotiating the Camp David Accords because he felt it was the right thing to do regardless of the consequences. He was met with strong resistance in several government agencies when he challenged old foreign policy procedures (Skowronek, 1993, p.366). Hargrove (1988) states that Carter met with a small group of former Democratic leaders and was advised not to continue involvement in Middle East issues because it was harming the Democrats with American Jewish voters. Reynolds (2007) states, Carter earned both Begin's and Sadat's praise when the Camp David Summit ended. However, his popularity rating at home remained low. Bourne (1997) argues the American public did not appreciate his achievements at Camp David because it was more of a contribution to the world and the future of mankind, rather than something Americans felt they benefitted from.

Domin (2003) believes that Carter has great strength of character. Carter talks to everyone regardless of their beliefs, affirming them as individuals by allowing them to reach out in kind, and to create peaceful solutions to problems. Carter knew he could not make friends of Sadat and Begin, but he did enable them to reconcile some of their personal and policy differences at Camp David. Stein (1999) believes that it was not only Carter's persistence that made him successful at Camp David, but also his determination to do the "right thing."

Carter gave of himself extensively during the Summit. He wrote in his memoirs that on Day 7 of the Summit he had "never been more exhausted in his life" (p. 383). When the Summit was on the verge of breakdown on Day 10, Carter sat down and looked at what had been accomplished. He was "heartbroken" when he realized that a very small gap existed in the differences of the unsettled parts of the framework (Reynolds, 2007, p. 326). Domin (2003) states that Carter prayed when he met roadblocks in the negotiations and his faith in God often enabled him to continue. Reynolds (2007) argues that no other President has

shown such personal concern for the Middle East. Carter led the Middle East peace effort because he wanted to do what was right for the greater good, and not for personal gain. Carter understood the importance of peace and felt the results would be worth the price of unpopularity with the American people. Shortly before the signing of the treaty Carter (1982) writes,

Despite some adverse reaction at home and abroad, nothing could diminish the importance of peace. No matter what might happen in the future, it was much more likely that American interests in the Middle East would be enhanced by this new relationship between our two friends, and the people of Egypt and Israel could reap great economic and political benefits if their leaders could capitalize wisely on this opportunity for progress and stability. (p. 427)

Third aspect: Prudent leaders have the ability to reason soundly while showing good moral judgment.

Uhr (2005) states, it takes sound judgment and practical wisdom in order to follow the right means in order to obtain the desired results. Using sound judgment enables a leader to weigh options by deliberating and contemplating different paths in order to achieve the desired outcome using the best available path (Uhr, 2005, p.68). Tutu (1998) believes that a leader with intuition has the capacity to read the signs of the times and know when and how to “go for it” (p. 70). Stein (1999) argues that Carter believed there was a solution to the Middle East problem and worked to develop a path towards this peace. Bourne (1997) adds that Carter saw the historic opportunity and he felt a personal obligation to seize it.

Medhurst (2007) states, every leader chooses to exercise their power differently. It is this interpretation, choice, and action, as well as the leader’s beliefs and values, from which these behaviors derive (p. 59). Merkley (2004) states it was during Begin’s first visit with Carter, that the president used Bible verse to convince Begin that there was a need for peace

in the Middle East and that it was possible to achieve. Merkley also argues that Carter believed that all the participants shared a belief in the same God and that this would help the peace process. Both Begin and Sadat hoped that this shared spirituality would endear Carter to their issues. Sadat and Carter formed a bond because of their shared spirituality and concern for human rights. Merkley (2004) states that Sadat praised Carter because he felt he was true to himself and others. Begin's relationship with Carter was less personal and more of a working relationship. Reynolds (2007) argues that Carter understood Begin by studying his background, and since Carter found it difficult to negotiate directly with Begin, he reasoned that he should deal with Begin's advisors extensively during the negotiations at Camp David. It was this ability to reason soundly and see different avenues in the peace process that enabled Carter to work effectively with both leaders at the peace talks.

Fourth aspect: Prudent leaders must take action in order to achieve the desired goal; this follows a period of reasoned deliberation, including a review of environmental circumstance and an understanding of moral purpose.

Kanungo (1996) states, prudence is not only the objective assessment of a situation, but also the implementation of a solution to the situation using sound judgment. Carter believes, "the worst thing you can do is not to try" (Martin & Barnes, 2003, p. 43). At the beginning of the second year of Carter's administration, the general consensus from the political establishment was that the United States should give up on peace in the Middle East. However, Carter continued to work not only with Israel and Egypt, but attempted to attract other moderate Arab regimes into the peace process (Merkley, 2004). Jones (1988) states, Carter promised to act on his ideas, he would not just propose ideas but would follow through with implementation. Hargrove (1988) believes Carter's willingness to pursue an idea until the end is why he refused to abandon his peace quest unless convinced that the situation was completely hopeless.

Carter was open to new ideas and thought that it would be best to try a new approach with the Camp David negotiations. Bourne (1997) notes, it is traditional to work out the underlings of an agreement before meeting at the negotiation table. The plan for Camp David was to work out a framework step by step while at Camp David and not to have the major points of the agreement decided upon before the talks. Also, it was unprecedented when Carter brought the leaders together to do the negotiations themselves. Because of this different approach, Carter (1982) writes that an intensely personal effort was required of all three leaders. He felt the need to fully understand both Begin and Sadat in order for this approach to be successful.

Carter chose Camp David as the setting for the talks for several reasons. He wanted to be able to control the environment and minimize leaks, which enabled the parties to enter into intense personal relationships, because there was no need for creating a public image with no press in attendance (Carter, 1982). Merkley (2004) argues Carter did not want to force a result by setting up a time clock before the negotiations began, which enabled the talks to continue over a period of 13 days. All of these factors demonstrate Carter's ability to be creative and flexible when taking action.

Fifth aspect: Prudent leaders must do the best they can to align their moral purpose with real world circumstances in order to achieve results that will benefit the greater good.

There was a sense of urgency to move the Middle East process along during the Carter administration. Merkley (2004) argues that all the leaders involved believed that the Camp David negotiations were the last chance for peace. Because of this, Carter was willing to take the risk of becoming a full partner at Camp David instead of only a third party (Mahmood, 1985, p.74). Carter (1998) recognized the need to have willing dialog between the parties, because this enables compromise and results. Carter continues to state that there must be a basic desire for peace in order for negotiations to be effective, as well as a basic desire to

consider the views of others. Carter was an expert at aligning real world situations to his moral purpose. On Day 12, Carter met with Begin to discuss Begin's reluctance to withdraw settlements from the Sinai. Carter (1982) states that he understood that Begin was afraid to trade land for peace and Carter suggested that the Israeli Knesset (legislature) be allowed to vote on this decision. Begin agreed to this proposal, relieved that he would not be solely responsible for such an important precedence. This idea allowed the peace negotiations to move forward. Carter always aimed high and did not let others deter him, while at the same time he was conscious of what was going on around him and responded appropriately.

Carter did not assign failure to others. Hargrove (1988) believes that if Carter saw an issue as his responsibility, he seized it. He always took responsibility for both his successes and failures. Because of this, Carter was invested in all he tried to achieve. Hargrove continues to state that Carter was harder on himself than others were on him. He held a firm belief that all good things would prevail and he diligently worked towards this end. Carter convinced both Begin and Sadat to stay at Camp David for 13 days even though both men threatened to leave several times. Stein (1999) understands that Sadat and Begin did not want to risk bad relations with the United States, but they also were facing strong pressures from home not to compromise and enter into an unpopular agreement. Carter understood this and acted accordingly, so that both Begin and Sadat felt compelled to continue the talks.

Carter was comfortable in his conviction that he was doing the right thing by pursuing Middle East peace. Merkley (2004) states, Carter worked to frame a theological context for the deliberations in order to achieve success at Camp David. Carter (1982) encouraged the other leaders to participate in a "World Prayer" day before the talks commenced. He spoke of a divine reward for both Sadat and Begin if they succeeded at Camp David (Merkley, 2004, p. 121). Reynolds (2007) states Carter also felt that it was important to hold religious

services for all the represented faiths present at Camp David. Wall (1990) establishes that there is much commonality between the Muslim, Christian and Jewish faiths. They all call for a degree of justice, peace, service, equality, and some humility. Wall continues to argue that both Carter and Sadat tried to build on this commonality. However, Begin was uncomfortable with this idea. Carter states in his memoirs that he recognized Begin's resistance and did not attempt to force the issue, but instead, allowed Begin to be included in this common idea without making him feel that he had to accept it. Carter (1982) also states, even though he wanted to provide a certain tone at Camp David in order to improve the chances for success, he recognized that he had to work with what was before him, always remaining flexible.

Bourne (1997) argues that Carter had the ability to invoke trust as an honest broker from those at Camp David. In Carter's memoirs he states that Sadat trusted him too much and Begin not enough. This interplay of leadership dynamics made it difficult for Carter to establish a balance in dealing with the two leaders. Ryback (1985) argues that Carter assumed the wise old man, prophet archetype, while Begin and Sadat took the roles of warrior/hero allowing Carter to build up trust with each leader to move the process forward. Wall (1990) points out that with one of the players giving Carter great trust and one very reserved with his trust, Carter was required to deal with each leader in different ways. Carter dealt personally with Sadat on most issues; however, he usually dealt directly with Begin's advisors, before dealing with Begin himself. Carter was able to look at what real world circumstances existed and adjust his leadership style in order to achieve the desired results.

Sixth aspect: Prudent leaders have to revisit their goals and make adjustments as environmental circumstances change, in order to reach the best possible conclusions that will reap the greatest benefits for the common good.

At the time the Camp David talks began, Carter intended to pursue one framework which would encompass the Palestinian issue and a bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel.

He did not want a separate agreement for peace between Egypt and Israel. Reynolds (2007) states on day three of the Summit, both Sadat and Begin wanted to break off the talks after they submitted their individual proposals and thought that each other's proposal was unreasonable. Carter had to physically block the door and beg them to stay to continue the talks. Reynolds points out that this was the last face to face meeting between Begin and Sadat. Carter then decided to bring forth a Comprehensive American Proposal, which went through 23 working drafts, breaking apart into two frameworks, in order to get acceptance from both Begin and Sadat (Appendix A). Carter looked at the environmental issues, namely the difficulty in getting acceptance of Palestinian autonomy, and decided that the only solution was to separate the issues to assure that at least some advancement for the common good would result (Hargrove, 1988, p. 129).

Carter and the other leaders were elated when an agreement was reached on Day 13 of the Summit. However, this honeymoon was short lived. Bourne (1997) states both leaders faced domestic criticism which caused Begin to immediately start backtracking from promises he had agreed to at Camp David. Carter (1982) condemned the Israelis for lack of compliance with the Accords because he felt this prevented peace. This was an unpopular comment domestically, since America supports Israel consistently. Merkley (2004) argues the peace process was in serious trouble of failure at the end of 1978, since both Begin and Sadat had met with resistance back home after Camp David. According to Bourne (1997), Carter decided to visit the Middle East in March of 1979, because he felt that Begin needed support to prevent him from feeling that he bore the whole burden for Israel's future alone. Merkley also states that Carter visited Egypt during this trip in order to secure the finalization of the Accords. Powell (1984) argues Carter was optimistic that his Middle East visit would reap an agreement even though his administration thought that the visit would not yield the desired results since animosities between the two countries were at such an elevated level.

Carter recognized environmental changes, realizing that the peace process was stalled and acted accordingly so as to gain beneficial results.

Seventh aspect: Prudent leaders do the right thing at the right time for the right reason in the right manner, all so that the greatest good is achieved for everyone.

According to Jones (1988), doing what is right becomes a practical means for getting the job done when faced with a political problem. Carter (1982) decided that it would be best, win or lose, to go all out in the pursuit of Middle East peace. Bradley (1981) explains the complex political environment at the time in the Middle East: (1) a newly elected rightist Israeli coalition headed by Begin took office in May 1977, (2) intermittent Israeli intervention in the internal conflict in Lebanon, (3) a negative reaction in most Arab states to President Sadat's peace initiative in 1977 and his willingness to make a separate peace with Israel in 1979, (4) the desire of the Soviet Union to exploit Arab disunity for its own purposes, and (5) the ability of the pro-Israel lobby in America to mobilize Congressional and public opinion against the Administration's policies viewed as harmful to Israeli interests (p. 2).

Berggren (2005) argues Carter not only understood that he should make the necessary personal sacrifices for the common good, but he also felt compelled to do so. Carter also believed that people would act in terms of higher principles when encouraged along the right path, therefore, enabling the greatest good to be achieved (Ryback, 1985, p. 164). Carter determined that the time was right for Middle East peace based on his belief that both Begin and Sadat wanted peace and were willing to make the necessary sacrifices to obtain it. He explained to Congress that the success at Camp David was the best way to attain this peace (Appendix B).

Uhr (2005) states that prudence involves appreciating the big picture and finding innovative ways of making justice come alive. Uhr continues to argue that prudence is a

virtue of insight, and involves acting in the concrete not abstract. On Day Six at Camp David, Carter arranged for a trip to Gettysburg with Begin and Sadat. Reynolds (2007) notes that the objective of this outing was to break the tension at Camp David, as well as to reinforce the effects of war. Carter (1982) states that both Sadat and Begin were interested in the Gettysburg site since they had studied the battle in military school. As they noted the casualty figures on the field markers, Carter mentioned how horribly the country had suffered with brother pitted against brother, demonstrating his ability to be creative when speaking about the underlining risks the parties faced. Reynolds (2007) states that both Begin and Sadat enjoyed the visit, while Carter hoped that the leaders would be refreshed and thoughtful as they resumed negotiations.

On Friday, Day Eleven, Carter wrote in his memoirs, "I awoke with the realization that we could go no further...on Sunday we would adjourn" (Carter, 1982, p. 391). After eleven days of negotiations Carter felt that success was not likely due the inability of Begin to agree to withdraw from the Sinai. However, Carter also writes that he did not want to give up. Reynolds (2007) states Carter continued to work on the framework and on Day Twelve, the leaders agreed to exchange letters on the contentious issues, including Jerusalem and the interpretation of certain words "West Bank" and "Palestinians," which would allow both frameworks to be approved. Carter (1982) states that Begin refused to sign any document on the morning of Day Thirteen. Carter decided to reword the Jerusalem letter, which was the main objection of Begin. After rewording this document, Carter autographed summit photos to give to Begin for his Grandchildren. He personalized each photo hoping that this would have some effect on Begin. Carter (1982) continues to explain what happened when he hand delivered the letter and the photographs:

I handed him the photographs. He took them and thanked me. Then he happened to look down and saw that his granddaughter's name was on the top one. He spoke it

aloud, and then looked at each photograph individually, repeating the name of the grandchild I had written on it. His lips trembled, and tears welled up in his eyes. He told me a little about each child, and especially about the one who seemed to be his favorite. We were both emotional as we talked quietly for a few minutes about grandchildren and about war. (p. 399)

After Carter left Begin, he walked back to his cabin dejected that Begin still refused to accept the Jerusalem letter. After a short time had passed, Begin called Carter and said he would accept the Jerusalem letter. Carter (1982) explains how the American delegation worked frantically on the final draft of the agreements. Carter used several tactics to sway both Begin and Sadat during the Camp David Summit, because he believed it was the right time for a Middle East peace agreement which would benefit the common good.

Outcome

All negotiations terminate with a certain outcome. According to Bercovitch (1986) there are three possible results to a negotiation, (1) an agreement can be reached, (2) the negotiations will continue, (3) the negotiations will be abandoned. The Camp David talks ended with the first result being achieved, having established an explicit agreement. Although a bilateral peace agreement was not the sole purpose of the negotiations, it is an achievement that created a new reality in the Middle East. The Camp David Summit produced two frameworks (Appendix A), one outlining bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel, and enabled the signing of a formal peace treaty between the two countries in March 1979, as well as, a second Framework encouraging the continuation of the peace process in the Middle East.

Carter's demonstration of prudential leadership at the Camp David accords provides an excellent example of the importance of this type of leadership. Uhr (2005) states prudence is the standard for ethical leadership. Carter consistently demonstrated qualities which

enabled him success at Camp David. Stein (1999) argues that Carter's characteristics of dogged determination and faith helped him find acceptable compromises during negotiations. Carter (1982) states, he was presented with the rare opportunity to offer others the way to peace. During his speech to Congress at the conclusion of the talks (Appendix B) he does not accept personal credit for success but offers it to Sadat and Begin. Carter (1982) believes that everyone wins with this peace and that it was important to undertake the peace process when he did and not leave it for future people. Without Carter's prudential leadership at Camp David it is unlikely that a framework for peace would have been achieved.

Conclusion

In view of the complex nature of prudential leadership it is not surprising that many researchers find it difficult to define, as well as, to apply to an individual. The definition created for this case study is divided into seven aspects in order to make the process manageable when applying prudential leadership. One can get beyond this single case by utilizing historical fact and applying this prudential leadership definition to other individuals in order to understand it beyond the single case study presented here. Although prudence is rare, there are documented cases of individual statesmanship where moral and intellectual virtues are demonstrated, such as Lincoln and Churchill, which would illuminate prudential leadership further.

Carter provides an excellent case study for prudential leadership because his actions at Camp David amplified the understanding of this leadership theory and demonstrated the value of prudential leadership theory. Berggren (2005) states Carter sought to apply his faith to politics and use it to guide his presidential behavior, in the hopes that he would do the right thing. Carter pursued his vision of Middle East peace because of his passionate desire to advance humanity. Not only were Carter's actions at Camp David demonstrative of prudential leadership, but his overall foreign policy represented prudential leadership, characterizing a new moral idealism for America.

According to Reynolds (2007) Carter, Sadat, and Begin, all paid a price for participating in the Camp David accords and signing the peace agreement. Sadat was ostracized in the Arab world, and assassinated by Islamic extremists in 1981. Begin faced protests at home and slipped into a deep depression. Reynolds also argues that Carter's defeat in the 1980 presidential election was due in part to his intense engagement in the high level diplomacy at Camp David. All three leaders understood that their decisions would be unpopular to many of their constituents. Carter had the difficult job of convincing both Begin

and Sadat that peace was not only possible between their two countries but that it was the right thing to do regardless of the consequences.

President Carter's leadership at Camp David was successful. Its success was possible because of Carter's ability to use the several prudential leadership concepts developed here effectively throughout the negotiations. As we recognize the importance of prudential leadership, we should also attempt to apply it to other leaders who have made significant contributions to our society. In identifying possible individuals when applying prudential leadership theory, we should not only look back historically, but look at current leaders who demonstrate aspects of prudential leadership as defined in this paper. As additional research is completed on prudential leadership, more opportunities will present themselves where prudential leadership theory can be used as a method to further the understanding of an individual's leadership style, as well as assist in the development of future leadership with the potential to improve communities and our world.

In our current complex global society, prudential leadership is a helpful tool in the resolution of conflicts and in making sound decisions which impact global populations. If we can identify and learn from additional prudential leaders, this type of ethical leadership will provide the means for a better world where decisions would be made exclusively for the greater good. The intension of developing this comprehensive applicable prudential leadership definition is not only to apply it only to this single case study, but to enable others to use it to advance prudential leadership theory and to be able to identify other prudential leaders in order to promote the theory.

Appendix A

The Camp David Accords

Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty

between Egypt and Israel

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:

It is agreed that:

- The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.
- All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
- Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.
- The following matters are agreed between the parties:
 1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
 2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
 3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;
 4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
 5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
 6. the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

- No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

- Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).
- In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.
- Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.
- The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.
- Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.
- United Nations forces will be stationed:
 1. in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and
 2. in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.
- After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

**For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:**

Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

**For the Government
of Israel:**

Menachem Begin

Witnessed by:

**Jimmy Carter,
President of the United States of America**

The Camp David Accords

The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
- After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.
- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.
- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.
- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.

- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

- **West Bank and Gaza**

Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

1. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
2. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security

locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

3. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:
 - i. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
 - ii. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
 - iii. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
 - iv. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

- v. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
- vi. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
- vii. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

- **Egypt-Israel**

1. Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view the achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

- **Associated Principles**

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by

all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

- i. Full recognition
 - ii. Abolishing economic boycotts;
 - iii. Guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
 4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
 5. The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.
 6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies an actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

**For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:**

Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

**For the Government
of Israel:**

Menachem Begin

Witnessed by:

**Jimmy Carter,
President of the United States of America**

Appendix B

Jimmy Carter Camp David Meeting on the Middle East Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress. September 18, 1978

Vice President Mondale, Speaker O'Neill, distinguished Members of the United States Congress, Justices of the Supreme Court, other leaders of our great Nation, ladies and gentlemen:

It's been more than 2,000 years since there was peace between Egypt and a free Jewish nation. If our present expectations are realized, this year we shall see such peace again.

The first thing I would like to do is to give tribute to the two men who made this impossible dream now become a real possibility, the two great leaders with whom I have met for the last 2 weeks at Camp David: first, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and the other, of course, is Prime Minister Menahem Begin of the nation of Israel.

I know that all of you would agree that these are two men of great personal courage, representing nations of peoples who are deeply grateful to them for the achievement which they have realized. And I am personally grateful to them for what they have done.

At Camp David, we sought a peace that is not only of vital importance to their own two nations but to all the people of the Middle East, to all the people of the United States, and, indeed, to all the world as well.

The world prayed for the success of our efforts, and I am glad to announce to you that these prayers have been answered.

I've come to discuss with you tonight what these two leaders have accomplished and what this means to all of us.

The United States has had no choice but to be deeply concerned about the Middle East and to try to use our influence and our efforts to advance the cause of peace. For the last 30 years, through four wars, the people of this troubled region have paid a terrible price in suffering and division and hatred and bloodshed. No two nations have suffered more than Egypt and Israel. But the dangers and the costs of conflicts in this region for our own Nation have been great as well. We have longstanding friendships among the nations there and the peoples of the region, and we have profound moral commitments which are deeply rooted in our values as a people.

The strategic location of these countries and the resources that they possess mean that events in the Middle East directly affect people everywhere. We and our friends could not be indifferent if a hostile power were to establish domination there. In few areas of the world is there a greater risk that a local conflict could spread among other nations adjacent to them and then, perhaps, erupt into a tragic confrontation between us super powers ourselves.

Our people have come to understand that unfamiliar names like Sinai, Aqaba, Sharm el Sheikh, Ras en Naqb, Gaza, the West Bank of Jordan, can have a direct and immediate bearing on our own wellbeing as a nation and our hope for a peaceful world. That is why

we in the United States cannot afford to be idle bystanders and why we have been full partners in the search for peace and why it is so vital to our Nation that these meetings at Camp David have been a success.

Through the long years of conflict, four main issues have divided the parties involved. One is the nature of peace—whether peace will simply mean that the guns are silenced, that the bombs no longer fall, that the tanks cease to roll, or whether it will mean that the nations of the Middle East can deal with each other as neighbors and as equals and as friends, with a full range of diplomatic and cultural and economic and human relations between them. That's been the basic question. The Camp David agreement has defined such relationships, I'm glad to announce to you, between Israel and Egypt.

The second main issue is providing for the security of all parties involved, including, of course, our friends, the Israelis, so that none of them need fear attack or military threats from one another. When implemented, the Camp David agreement, I'm glad to announce to you, will provide for such mutual security.

Third is the question of agreement on secure and recognized boundaries, the end of military occupation, and the granting of self-government or else the return to other nations of territories which have been occupied by Israel since the 1967 conflict. The Camp David agreement, I'm glad to announce to you, provides for the realization of all these goals.

And finally, there is the painful human question of the fate of the Palestinians who live or who have lived in these disputed regions. The Camp David agreement guarantees that the Palestinian people may participate in the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects, a commitment that Israel has made in writing and which is supported and appreciated, I'm sure, by all the world.

Over the last 18 months, there has been, of course, some progress on these issues. Egypt and Israel came close to agreeing about the first issue, the nature of peace. They then saw that the second and third issues, that is, withdrawal and security, were intimately connected, closely entwined. But fundamental divisions still remained in other areas—about the fate of the Palestinians, the future of the West Bank and Gaza, and the future of Israeli settlements in occupied Arab territories.

We all remember the hopes for peace that were inspired by President Sadat's initiative, that great and historic visit to Jerusalem last November that thrilled the world, and by the warm and genuine personal response of Prime Minister Begin and the Israeli people, and by the mutual promise between them, publicly made, that there would be no more war. These hopes were sustained when Prime Minister Begin reciprocated by visiting Ismailia on Christmas Day. That progress continued, but at a slower and slower pace through the early part of the year. And by early summer, the negotiations had come to a standstill once again.

It was this stalemate and the prospect for an even worse future that prompted me to invite both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to join me at Camp David. They accepted,

as you know, instantly, without delay, without preconditions, without consultation even between them.

It's impossible to overstate the courage of these two men or the foresight they have shown. Only through high ideals, through compromises of words and not principle, and through a willingness to look deep into the human heart and to understand the problems and hopes and dreams of one another can progress in a difficult situation like this ever be made. That's what these men and their wise and diligent advisers who are here with us tonight have done during the last 13 days.

When this conference began, I said that the prospects for success were remote. Enormous barriers of ancient history and nationalism and suspicion would have to be overcome if we were to meet our objectives. But President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have overcome these barriers, exceeded our fondest expectations, and have signed two agreements that hold out the possibility of resolving issues that history had taught us could not be resolved.

The first of these documents is entitled, "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David." It deals with a comprehensive settlement, comprehensive agreement, between Israel and all her neighbors, as well as the difficult question of the Palestinian people and the future of the West Bank and the Gaza area.

The agreement provides a basis for the resolution of issues involving the West Bank and Gaza during the next 5 years. It outlines a process of change which is in keeping with Arab hopes, while also carefully respecting Israel's vital security.

The Israeli military government over these areas will be withdrawn and will be replaced with a self-government of the Palestinians who live there. And Israel has committed that this government will have full autonomy. Prime Minister Begin said to me several times, not partial autonomy, but full autonomy.

Israeli forces will be withdrawn and redeployed into specified locations to protect Israel's security. The Palestinians will further participate in determining their own future through talks in which their own elected representatives, the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, will negotiate with Egypt and Israel and Jordan to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel has agreed, has committed themselves, that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people will be recognized. After the signing of this framework last night, and during the negotiations concerning the establishment of the Palestinian self-government, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The future settlements issue will be decided among the negotiating parties.

The final status of the West Bank and Gaza will be decided before the end of the 5-year transitional period during which the Palestinian Arabs will have their own government, as part of a negotiation which will produce a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan specifying borders, withdrawal, all those very crucial issues.

These negotiations will be based on all the provisions and the principles of Security Council Resolution 242, with which you all are so familiar. The agreement on the final status of these areas will then be submitted to a vote by the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, and they will have the right for the first time in their history, the Palestinian people, to decide how they will govern themselves permanently.

We also believe, of course, all of us, that there should be a just settlement of the problems of displaced persons and refugees, which takes into account appropriate United Nations resolutions.

Finally, this document also outlines a variety of security arrangements to reinforce peace between Israel and her neighbors. This is, indeed, a comprehensive and fair framework for peace in the Middle East, and I'm glad to report this to you.

The second agreement is entitled, "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel." It returns to Egypt its full exercise of sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula and establishes several security zones, recognizing carefully that sovereignty right for the protection of all parties. It also provides that Egypt will extend full diplomatic recognition to Israel at the time the Israelis complete an interim withdrawal from most of the Sinai, which will take place between 3 months and 9 months after the conclusion of the peace treaty. And the peace treaty is to be fully negotiated and signed no later than 3 months from last night.

I think I should also report that Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have already challenged each other to conclude the treaty even earlier. And I hope they [applause]. This final conclusion of a peace treaty will be completed late in December, and it would be a wonderful Christmas present for the world.

Final and complete withdrawal of all Israeli forces will take place between 2 and 3 years following the conclusion of the peace treaty.

While both parties are in total agreement on all the goals that I have just described to you, there is one issue on which agreement has not yet been reached. Egypt states that agreement to remove the Israeli settlements from Egyptian territory is a prerequisite to a peace treaty. Israel says that the issue of the Israeli settlements should be resolved during the peace negotiations themselves.

Now, within 2 weeks, with each member of the Knesset or the Israeli Parliament acting as individuals, not constrained by party loyalty, the Knesset will decide on the issue of the settlements. Our own Government's position, my own personal position is well known on this issue and has been consistent. It is my strong hope, my prayer, that the question of Israeli settlements on Egyptian territory will not be the final obstacle to peace.

None of us should underestimate the historic importance of what has already been done. This is the first time that an Arab and an Israeli leader have signed a comprehensive framework for peace. It contains the seeds of a time when the Middle East, with all its vast potential, may be a land of human richness and fulfillment, rather than a land of

bitterness and continued conflict. No region in the world has greater natural and human resources than this one, and nowhere have they been more heavily weighed down by intense hatred and frequent war. These agreements hold out the real possibility that this burden might finally be lifted.

But we must also not forget the magnitude of the obstacles that still remain. The summit exceeded our highest expectations, but we know that it left many difficult issues which are still to be resolved. These issues will require careful negotiation in the months to come. The Egyptian and Israeli people must recognize the tangible benefits that peace will bring and support the decisions their leaders have made, so that a secure and a peaceful future can be achieved for them. The American public, you and I, must also offer our full support to those who have made decisions that are difficult and those who have very difficult decisions still to make.

What lies ahead for all of us is to recognize the statesmanship that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have shown and to invite others in that region to follow their example. I have already, last night, invited the other leaders of the Arab world to help sustain progress toward a comprehensive peace.

We must also join in an effort to bring an end to the conflict and the terrible suffering in Lebanon. This is a subject that President Sadat discussed with me many times while I was in Camp David with him. And the first time that the three of us met together, this was a subject of heated discussion. On the way to Washington last night in the helicopter, we mutually committed ourselves to join with other nations, with the Lebanese people themselves, all factions, with President Sarkis, with Syria and Saudi Arabia, perhaps the European countries like France, to try to move toward a solution of the problem in Lebanon, which is so vital to us and to the poor people in Lebanon, who have suffered so much.

We will want to consult on this matter and on these documents and their meaning with all of the leaders, particularly the Arab leaders. And I'm pleased to say to you tonight that just a few minutes ago, King Hussein of Jordan and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, perhaps other leaders later, but these two have already agreed to receive Secretary Vance, who will be leaving tomorrow to explain to them the terms of the Camp David agreement. And we hope to secure their support for the realization of the new hopes and dreams of the people of the Middle East.

This is an important mission, and this responsibility, I can tell you, based on my last 2 weeks with him, could not possibly rest on the shoulders of a more able and dedicated and competent man than Secretary Cyrus Vance.

Finally, let me say that for many years the Middle East has been a textbook for pessimism, a demonstration that diplomatic ingenuity was no match for intractable human conflicts. Today we are privileged to see the chance for one of the sometimes rare, bright moments in human history—a chance that may offer the way to peace. We have a chance for peace, because these two brave leaders found within themselves the willingness to work together to seek these lasting prospects for peace, which we all want

so badly. And for that, I hope that you will share my prayer of thanks and my hope that the promise of this moment shall be fully realized.

The prayers at Camp David were the same as those of the shepherd King David, who prayed in the 85th Psalm, "Wilt thou not revive us again: that thy people may rejoice in thee?... I will hear what God the Lord will speak: for he will speak peace unto his people, and unto his saints: but let them not return again unto folly."

And I would like to say, as a Christian, to these two friends of mine, the words of Jesus, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be the children of God."

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